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INTRODUCTION
Each year, the United States Supreme Court denies
thousands of petitions for certiorari. 1 For the vast majority of
these petitions, the final words spoken on the case are terse. The
denied petitions are listed underneath a bolded, fully-capitalized
CERTIORARI DENIED heading and that is the last anyone
hears of them. 2 Occasionally, however, one or more of the
members of the Court feel strongly enough that a case should
have been heard that they compose a dissent. Stormans v.
Wiesman was one such case.
The Stormans dissent began dramatically: “This case is an
ominous sign,” wrote Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas. 3 Justice
Alito went on to argue that denying certiorari imperiled the
viability of future cases asserting rights to the free exercise of
religion under the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. 4
†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2018, St. John’s University School of
Law. I would like to thank my Note advisor, Professor Mark Movsesian, for all of the
help he gave me in choosing my thesis, writing my Note, and editing it to be fit for
publication. I could not have completed this project without him, and I will always
be grateful for his mentorship. I would also like to thank the staff and editors of the
Law Review for all of their hard work preparing this piece for publication.
1
The Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2018)
(stating that of the 7,000-8,000 cases filed with the Court each year, only around 80
are granted plenary review and about 100 or more are disposed of without plenary
review).
2
Miscellaneous Order, 579 U.S. ___ (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.
gov/orders/courtorders/062816zr_29m1.pdf
3
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
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Stormans involved an ongoing problem not unique to
Washington State, where the case arose, or even to the United
States generally. The Stormans family, through their closely
held corporation, Stormans, Inc., owned a grocery store in
Olympia, Washington. 5 Within this grocery store was a general
pharmacy. 6 The Stormans family are devout Christians and ran
their company in accordance with their beliefs. 7 They faced no
issues in doing so until 2005, when the State of Washington
passed new regulations that required pharmacies to stock and
dispense the so-called “morning-after” and “week-after” pills. 8
The Stormans believe that these emergency contraceptives have
the potential to cause an abortion, and since participating in an
abortion would violate their religious beliefs, the Stormans
declined to carry such drugs in their pharmacy. 9
For its part, in passing these new regulations, the State of
Washington was reacting to a nationwide movement in favor of
broadening access to these drugs as part of a commitment to
ensure citizens’ full protection of their reproductive rights. 10
Critics have complained that it is unethical for pharmacists,
medical professionals, to employ their individual moral beliefs on
the job by refusing to provide emergency contraceptives. 11 The
stage was set for a conflict involving sensitive issues and
fundamental Constitutional rights.
After the State of
Washington issued the Stormans several citations for violating
the new stocking and dispensing rules, the Stormans sued in
federal court for an injunction preventing the State from
enforcing the rules against them. 12

Stormans, 136 S. Ct. at 2433.
Id.
7
Id.
8
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/case/stormans-vwiesman/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
9
Id.
10
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 935 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d
sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015).
11
Pharmacists Should Not Be Allowed To Opt Out Of Selling Morning After Pill
On Ethical Grounds, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.
co.uk/2013/01/31/health-pharmacists-refuse-morning-after-pill-ethical-banned_n_25
88021.html.
12
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8.
5
6
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The trial court found in favor of the Stormans on their Free
Exercise Clause claim, but the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed. 13 By denying certiorari in the case,
the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity to clarify
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, and to provide guidance to
the states on how best to ensure that both free exercise rights
and reproductive rights are respected.
This Note will argue that by denying certiorari in Stormans
v. Wiesman, the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity
to provide guidance to the states as to how the Free Exercise
Clause applies to the kind of stocking and dispensing regulations
adopted by the State of Washington. This Note will further
argue from a policy perspective that the approach to these kinds
of regulations adopted by the Republic of Ireland (“ROI”)
presents the best approach for states to adopt because it provides
a balance in terms of respecting the free exercise rights of
pharmacists and pharmacy owners with the reproductive rights
of the general public. In Part I, this Note will survey the history
of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, with
particular emphasis placed on Employment Division v. Smith
and the dramatic changes it made to existing jurisprudence at
the time it was decided. In Part II, this Note will consider the
Stormans case in detail from the decision of the trial court,
through the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, and the ultimate denial of
certiorari over the dissent of three justices. In Part III, this Note
will examine the approach to this problem taken by ROI,
highlighting its relatively uncontroversial history and flexible
standards. Finally, in Part IV, this Note will first argue that the
Supreme Court should have taken and reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision as inconsistent with precedent and overly
skeptical of the factual conclusions of the trial court. Then, it will
propose that the ROI approach to these regulations is the best
from a policy perspective because it provides the best balance of
religious and reproductive rights.
I.

THE HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Free Exercise
Clause has alternated between strict and loose interpretations of
its breadth. One of the questions the Court has confronted most
13

Id.
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often is to what degree private individuals should be able to
disregard generally applicable laws that conflict with their
religious beliefs.
A.

The Reynolds Approach to Free Exercise Claims

The Court addressed this question for the first time in 1878
in Reynolds v. United States. 14 Reynolds involved a challenge to
the federal government’s prohibition of bigamy in the territories,
known as the Morrill Act for the Suppression of Bigamy. 15
Mormon church member George Reynolds, a bigamist and
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was
convicted under the Act. 16 He appealed his case all the way to
the Supreme Court, where he argued that bigamy was a required
practice of his religion and therefore the Free Exercise Clause
should protect him from legal punishment for engaging in it. 17
In rejecting his Free Exercise claim, the Court spoke in
absolute terms: “Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
The Court seemed
opinions, they may with practices.” 18
dismissive even of the idea that one could avoid complying with
generally applicable laws because of one’s religious duty; the
Chief Justice, writing for the majority, famously declared that to
allow citizens to avoid conviction under such laws because of the
right to free exercise would “permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself.” 19 While the Court did not define the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause per se, it did say what the Clause was
not: a license to disregard laws that apply to everyone equally.
B. A New Approach: Sherbert v. Verner
After Reynolds, the Supreme Court did not address the Free
Exercise Clause again until it incorporated the Clause against
the states in the 1940 case Cantwell v. Connecticut. 20 This set
the stage for the Court to revisit the meaning of the Clause in
14
See 98 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1878); DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND
ORIGINAL INTENT 21 (2010).
15
DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 26.
16
Id. at 28.
17
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–62.
18
Id. at 166.
19
Id. at 167.
20
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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1963 in Sherbert v. Verner. The plaintiff, Adell H. Sherbert, was
a Seventh Day Adventist who lost her job at a textile mill after
refusing to work on Saturdays, which the Seventh Day Adventist
The South Carolina
religion recognizes as the Sabbath. 21
Employment Security Commission found that she had been fired
because she chose not to come to work voluntarily, and it
disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits for five
weeks. 22 The Court first found that the disqualification imposed
a burden on Sherbert’s free exercise of her religion; 23 Justice
William Brennan, writing for the majority, decried the
“unmistakable” pressure exerted by the state on Sherbert to
compel her to forego her religious practice: “The ruling forces her
to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand.” 24
After finding that Sherbert’s free exercise rights had been
violated, it remained for the Court to determine whether or not
the State’s violation of her rights was constitutionally valid. 25
The Court applied a variety of strict scrutiny 26 which would come
to be known as the “Sherbert test” 27 and determined that the
State had failed to present the compelling government interest
necessary for its action to be upheld. 28
The Sherbert Court’s approach represented a radical
departure from that taken by the Reynolds Court. While the
Reynolds Court focused its inquiry on the nature of the law being
challenged, the Sherbert Court focused on the burden to the
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398–99, 399 n.1 (1963).
Id. at 399–401, 400 n.3.
23
Id. at 404.
24
Id.
25
In other words, the plaintiff must first show that his or her sincerely held
religious beliefs are burdened by the government in some way in order to invoke
Sherbert-style strict scrutiny. Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The
Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431,
1438 (1990).
26
Strict scrutiny in the context of the Free Exercise Clause requires that the
government actor base its action on a compelling government interest; once it has
proven a compelling government interest, it must then show that the method it
chose to advance the interest is the least restrictive means of advancing that
interest. Id. at 1438–39.
27
Lee Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What Degree of Proof
Is Required?, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 613, 615 (1980).
28
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–09.
21
22
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individual challenging the violation of her rights. The tug-of-war
between these two approaches did not end after the
establishment of the Sherbert test.
The Court next applied the Sherbert test in a 1973 case,
Wisconsin v. Yoder. The appellant in Yoder, an Amish man,
challenged his conviction under a Wisconsin law requiring
students to attend school through the high school level. 29 He had
withdrawn his children from public school upon their completion
of the eighth grade. 30 He argued that the Free Exercise Clause
protected his right to withdraw his children from public school
after the eighth grade because the Amish religion required him
to more closely supervise their religious education at that point
in their lives. 31 The Court accepted his argument, ruling that the
Wisconsin law could not constitutionally be applied to him. 32 In
so holding, the Court reaffirmed the principle it had enunciated
in Sherbert: even “[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion.” 33
C. Employment Division v. Smith: The Reynolds Approach
Revived
The stated tension between supporters of the Reynolds
approach to the Free Exercise Clause and supporters of the
Sherbert test had not yet ended, however. Throughout the 1980s,
the Supreme Court became increasingly skeptical of Free
Exercise claims, often finding that asserted government interests
were compelling while construing the interests of the religious
objectors narrowly 34
This trend culminated in the 1991
Employment Division v. Smith decision, a watershed case that
marked the Court’s return to the Reynolds approach.
Employment Division v. Smith involved a set of facts similar
to those which had resulted in the creation of the Sherbert test.
Once again, plaintiffs challenged a state’s denial of

29
30
31
32
33
34

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08 (1972).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
Marin, supra note 25, at 1445.
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unemployment benefits. 35
Alfred Smith and Galen Black,
members of the Native American Church, worked for a private
drug rehabilitation center in Oregon. 36 As employees, Smith and
Black consumed peyote as part of a Native American Church
ritual, despite the possession of the drug being illegal in
Oregon. 37 Consequently, both men were fired from their jobs at
the private rehab facility, and applied to the Employment
Division for unemployment benefits. 38 The Employment Division
determined that they were ineligible for unemployment benefits
because they had been fired from their jobs due to work-related
misconduct. 39
The United States Supreme Court ruled on the case after the
Oregon Supreme Court determined that the Oregon statute,
which prohibited the use of peyote, as applied to the defendants,
was unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. 40 The
majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia marked a return to
the Reynolds approach to the Free Exercise Clause. Justice
Scalia first noted that there was no question that if a state
wanted to regulate conduct purely because it was engaged in for
a religious reason, it could not do so. 41 He distinguished that
circumstance, however, from that of a generally applicable state
prohibition of conduct which only incidentally burdened the
practice of religion. 42 In this second situation, Justice Scalia
reasoned, the Supreme Court had never before struck down a
state law as unconstitutional purely on the basis that it violated
the Free Exercise Clause. 43 In other words, states can refuse to
provide accommodations to neutral laws of general applicability
without violating the Free Exercise Clause, subject to certain
exceptions. 44

Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 876. See also Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 150 (Or. 1988), rev’d
sub nom. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
41
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78.
42
Id. at 878–79.
43
Id.
44
Id.
35
36
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Justice Scalia went on to explain that neutral, generally
applicable laws had only been struck down under the Free
Exercise Clause in certain special circumstances. 45 He first
spoke of the so-called “hybrid rights exception.” 46 The hybrid
rights exception, Justice Scalia explained, had been the basis of
the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder to strike down the neutral,
generally applicable school attendance law as applied to the
Amish objectors. 47 In that particular case, it had been the right
to free exercise in combination with the right of parents to direct
the education of their children which tilted the scales in favor of
the Amish. 48
Next, Justice Scalia discussed the “individual assessment
exception.”
According to Justice Scalia, the individual
assessment exception had been the rationale used by the court to
find violations of the Free Exercise Clause in unemployment
compensation cases like Sherbert. 49 The individual assessment
exception means that if the government actor charged with
enforcing a law is empowered to make exceptions to the law for
individuals for secular reasons, it must grant exceptions for
religious reasons as well. 50 Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned, the
Court in Sherbert had correctly held for the plaintiff because the
unemployment compensation administrator had the ability to
decide whether an employee had quit work or refused available
work for “good cause” and had determined that the plaintiff’s
refusal to work on Saturdays because of her religious convictions
was not a “good cause.” 51 He concluded that the Court’s
“decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition
that where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” 52

Id. at 881–84.
Ryan S. Rummage, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious
Liberty, 64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1184–85 (2015).
47
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 884.
50
Brief of Religious Liberty Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
2–3, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862).
51
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
52
Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
45
46
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D. Post-Employment Division: Further Developments in Free
Exercise Jurisprudence
For practical purposes, the Sherbert test is dead. The
Reynolds approach with the exceptions laid out in Smith has
become the law of the land. Congress attempted to revive the use
of strict scrutiny to evaluate even neutral, generally applicable
laws by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993. 53
The Act received overwhelming bipartisan support, including a
rare 97-3 vote in the Senate. 54 Nevertheless, the Court struck it
down as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, a 1997
case involving a Catholic archbishop’s challenge to an
unfavorable zoning decision. 55 The Smith approach remains the
approach used to evaluate Free Exercise Clause claims involving
neutral, generally applicable state laws.
The Court has subjected a facially neutral, generally
applicable law to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause
at least once since Smith. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. City of Hialeah, the Court examined a Florida municipality’s
Notably, there was
ordinance banning animal sacrifice. 56
extensive evidence that, while the law in question was facially
neutral, it had been enacted specifically in response to the
practices of the active Santeria religious community in the city. 57
While a seven-justice majority agreed that the law ought to
be subject to strict scrutiny and that it failed that test, they
53
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
54
Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress – 1st Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.
gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&v
ote=00331 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
55
See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). At least thirty-two
states have either passed their own laws similar to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (either as statutes or as amendments to state constitutions) or have
state court decisions on the books which provide similar protections. Juliet Eilperin,
31 States Have Heightened Religious Freedom Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 1,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-in-the-us-are-there-heightened-protections-for-religious-freedom/?utm_term=.fed3d02e8fcf;
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May
4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.
aspx (stating that in 2015 Arkansas became the thirty-second state to enact a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act-style provision).
56
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520
(1993).
57
Id. at 526–27.
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disagreed widely as to why. 58 Six justices joined the parts of
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion which subjected the
law to strict scrutiny and found that the city’s regulations
violated the Free Exercise Clause. 59 In a partial concurrence,
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist) argued
that Justice Kennedy should not have relied so heavily on
legislative history to strike down the regulation, and further
argued that had the town passed a facially neutral law with the
intent to target the Santeria religion there would have been no
violation. 60 Justice Souter wrote his own concurrence which
encouraged his colleagues to reexamine the Smith decision and
its effect on existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. 61
Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, openly challenged the Smith decision, arguing that it
had been wrongly decided. 62
II. STORMANS V. WIESMAN: A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE MEANING
OF FREE EXERCISE
Commentators have noted the inherent tension between
ensuring access to emergency contraceptives while also
respecting the religious objections of pharmacists to stocking and
dispensing them. 63 Critics on each side have accused the other of
not giving due weight to their asserted interests. 64 The State of
Washington moved to address the controversy in the mid-2000s.

See generally id.
Id. at 531–40, 542–47.
60
See generally id. at 557–59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
61
See generally id. at 559–77 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
62
See generally id. at 577–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
63
See Dennies Varughese, Comment, Conscience Misbranded!: Introducing the
Performer v. Facilitator Model for Determining the Suitability of Including
Pharmacists within Conscience Clause Legislation, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006);
see also Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy
Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 471–72
(2006).
64
Gene Veith, Christian Pharmacists Must Stock Abortifacients, CRANACH: THE
BLOG OF VEITH (July 1, 2016), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/geneveith/2016/07/
christian-pharmacists-must-stock-abortifacients/; Pharmacists Should Not Be
Allowed To Opt Out Of Selling Morning After Pill On Ethical Grounds, Argue
Researchers; HUFFINGTON POST, supra note 11.
58
59
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Lead-up to the Passage of the Regulations

In 2005, in response to the passage of an Illinois law
requiring pharmacies that stocked any kind of contraceptive to
stock emergency contraceptives, pro-choice groups began to lobby
Washington’s governor, Christine Gregoire (“the Governor”), to
push for similar regulations in Washington. 65 The State’s Board
of Pharmacy (occasionally referred to hereafter as “the Board”)
was responsible for regulating pharmacists in Washington. 66 The
Board was receptive to the idea of passing some kind of
regulation regarding emergency contraceptives, but the majority
of board members thought that any such regulation should
include a conscience opt-out for objecting pharmacists, which
would instead require them to refer those seeking emergency
contraceptives to pharmacies which carried the drugs. 67 This
kind of referral process “has long been legal in all 50 states” and
has been approved by the American Pharmacists Association. 68
At a January 2006 meeting, a majority of board members
indicated that they were in favor of adopting a regulation
requiring pharmacies to stock emergency contraceptives, but the
majority also agreed that the regulation should have a referral
provision for pharmacists who objected to stocking the drugs on
The Washington State Pharmacy
conscience grounds. 69
Association (“WSPA”) endorsed this approach. 70
Public hearings on the proposed regulation were held in
April 2006. 71 Pro-choice attendees related “refusal stories” of
incidents in which women seeking emergency contraceptives
were denied them by objecting pharmacists. 72 After the hearings,
the Board of Pharmacy drafted two versions of the proposed
regulation: one which prevented pharmacists from referring
patients seeking emergency contraceptives if the drugs were in
stock and the patient could pay for them; and a second which
allowed pharmacists to refuse to carry the drug for a variety of

65
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 935–36 (W.D. Wash. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015).
66
Id. at 932.
67
Id. at 937.
68
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8.
69
Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
70
Id. at 935.
71
Id. at 938.
72
Id. at 938.
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reasons, both secular and religious- or conscience-based, and to
refer patients to pharmacies which did. 73 At a June 1 meeting,
the Board voted unanimously to adopt the latter regulation. 74
Pro-choice groups presented the Governor with their own
draft of the regulation one week after the June 1 vote. 75 Steven
Saxe (“Mr. Saxe”), the executive director of the Board of
Pharmacy, later testified that the primary difference between the
rule passed on June 1 and the Governor’s new draft was that the
Governor’s draft did not allow referrals for conscience reasons. 76
In fact, there was evidence that the draft was written that way
on purpose—the Governor and her allies wanted to ensure that
no conscience-based referrals would be allowed. 77 The Governor
then convened a taskforce composed of representatives from prochoice groups, the WSPA, and the Board in order to build support
for her draft of the new rule. 78
The taskforce ultimately reached a compromise: in exchange
for the WSPA 79 dropping its proposal for a conscience-based
referral exemption, the Governor’s allies on the taskforce agreed
to permit referrals for a variety of other non-conscience and nonreligious reasons. 80 Additionally, the Board’s counsel indicated to

Id.
Id.
75
Id. at 939.
76
Id.
77
The trial court made findings of fact in regard to the following, among other
evidence: a memo from the Governor to one of the supporters of the new rule asking
“whether it was ‘clean enough for the advocates [i.e., Planned Parenthood, NWWLC
and NARAL] re: conscious/moral issues’ ”; an email from Mr. Saxe which “explained
the Governor's primary issue with the June 1 rule . . . ‘[T]he moral issue IS the basis
of the concern’ ”; and another email from Mr. Saxe which he wrote to the
Department of Health on the subject of how to ensure the rule reflected the
Governor’s intent: “ ‘Would a statement that does not allow a pharmacist/pharmacy
the right to refuse for moral or religious judgment be clearer? This would leave
intact the ability to decline to dispense (provide alternatives) for most legitimate
examples raised; clinical, fraud, business, skill, etc.’ ” Id. (emphasis in original).
78
Id. at 940. No conscientious objectors or pro-life groups were invited to
participate. Id.
79
Rod Shafer of the WSPA had been the only member of the taskforce insisting
on a conscience-based exemption. Id. at 941.
80
Id. Interestingly, the taskforce also confronted the problem of conscientious
objections to Washington’s Death with Dignity Act, which legalized physicianassisted suicide. Members of the task force agreed to allow conscientious objection to
the dispensing of lethal drugs. Id.
73
74
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it that the Board would also have the power to make individual
exemptions on a case-by-case basis. 81 The Board approved the
Governor’s final version of the regulations in April 2007. 82
B. Proceedings in the Trial Court
Stormans, Inc. is a closely held corporation owned by the
Stormans family. 83 At the time the pharmacy regulations
relating to emergency contraceptives were passed, the
corporation owned a grocery store with a general retail
pharmacy. 84 Members of the Stormans family believe that life
begins at conception, and therefore refuse to sell abortifacient
drugs on the ground that they can “potentially cause an
abortion.” 85
In July 2007, the family sued for an injunction to prevent the
State of Washington from enforcing the new regulations against
them. 86 The trial court, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, made extensive findings of fact
with regard to the regulations after a twelve-day trial in 2012. 87
The court found that the rulemaking process had focused almost
exclusively on the question of whether to allow conscience-based
objections to the stocking of emergency contraceptives. 88 The
court also found that the process had been political, and that the
Governor had repeatedly pressured the Board not to include
conscience exemptions in the final regulations; she had even
threatened to remove Board members who would not agree. 89
Witnesses from the Board confirmed at trial that they had not
yet been able to identify a case of any kind of drug that could not
be accessed, either before the new rules were promulgated, or
after. 90 The court rejected anecdotal stories of access problems
provided by pro-choice groups, finding that the stories were

81
82
83
84
85

932.

86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 941–42.
Id. at 942.
Id. at 931.
Id.
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8; Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8.
See generally Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 947.
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either not relevant to the case or that they were the product of a
test shopping campaign led by Planned Parenthood and other
groups. 91
The court did not focus exclusively on the rulemaking
process; it also addressed the actual application of the rule. 92
The trial court found that after the new regulations were passed,
referrals continued to be allowed for a wide variety of nonreligious reasons. 93 While some Board witnesses asserted that
the intent of the regulations was to allow referrals for only a
small number of non-religious reasons, the court found that the
Board had interpreted the exemptions broadly to cover a wide
variety of business reasons. 94 Additionally, Board witnesses
testified that in determining whether a given business reason fell
within the exemptions allowed by the regulation, the Board
would make determinations on a “case-by-case basis.” 95
The trial court found that the regulations were not neutral
and generally applicable: “In short, the Regulations were adopted
‘because of’ conscientious objections to Plan B, not merely ‘in
spite of’ them.” 96 The court then proceeded to apply strict
scrutiny to the regulations and found them both over and
underinclusive, 97 meaning that they did not further the
compelling state interest in ensuring access to medications.98
The court also held that the regulations as applied to the
Stormans family would actually harm the State’s interest, as the
Stormans family and other conscientious objectors would simply
be forced to close their pharmacies or exit the pharmaceutical
profession rather than dispense the drugs; this would make

91
Id. at 950–51. The court found that Planned Parenthood and other groups
posted advertisements on their websites soliciting women to call pharmacies to ask
if they stocked emergency contraceptives and to go into pharmacies and see if
pharmacists would actually dispense the drugs. Id. at 950.
92
Id. at 987–88.
93
The court found that referrals were permitted if a pharmacy was temporarily
out of stock of a medication, if it did not take the patient’s insurance, if the
pharmacist believed the patient was a drug abuser, if the pharmacist would have to
alter the drug in some way before dispensing it, if the pharmacist would have to
keep extra records on purchases of the drug, etc. See id. at 955–56.
94
Id. at 957.
95
Id. at 958.
96
Id. at 987 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 540 (1993).
97
Id. at 989–90.
98
Id.
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access to medications more difficult, not less. 99 The court entered
judgment in the form of a permanent injunction preventing
Washington from applying its regulations to the Stormans
family. 100
C. The State of Washington’s Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
The State of Washington appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 101 The Ninth Circuit found that the
regulations’ delivery requirement “applie[d] to all objections to
delivery that do not fall within an exemption, regardless of the
motivation behind those objections.” 102 Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit panel disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the
rule-makers had the impermissible motivation of targeting
religious objectors specifically. 103 Absent discriminatory intent or
application, the Ninth Circuit held that the regulations were
neutral for the purposes of analysis under Smith. 104
The Ninth Circuit proceeded to consider whether the rules
were generally applicable. The court held that while the
practices that were the subjects of the unwritten exemptions had
in fact occurred, the Commission had not permitted them; rather,
it had simply not received complaints about them. 105 Although
the trial court had heard testimony from members of the
Commission about how they believed the Commission would act
if it did receive a complaint regarding the unwritten exemptions,
the Ninth Circuit held that this was not the same as the
Commission collectively giving an official interpretation of the
rule. 106
Id. at 990.
Id. at 991–93.
101
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8.
102
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in
original). The Ninth Circuit opinion seems to flatly contradict the factual findings of
the trial court, which found precisely the opposite of what the Ninth Circuit did. The
trial court found that the regulations do not operate neutrally because the
Commission allows referrals for a wide variety of reasons not specifically mentioned
in the regulation itself. Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 955–56. Additionally, the
opinion included speculation about access problems if facilitated referrals were
allowed. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1078. This speculation was included despite the fact
that Board witnesses could not identify a single case of an access problem caused by
a facilitated referral regime in the trial court. Id. at 947.
103
Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1078.
104
Id. at 1079.
105
Id. at 1080–81.
106
Id. at 1081.
99

100
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The Ninth Circuit also addressed the Stormans family’s
contention that the regulations as written empowered the
Commission to make individualized exemptions to the rules. 107
The court found that any discretion the Commission could
exercise was tied to the objective, business-based criteria
explicitly set out in the text of the regulation. 108 The court again
rejected the testimony of individual commission members on the
subject and looked instead to the Commission’s official
commentary, which rejected both religious-based exemptions and
some business-based exemptions. 109
Finally, the court considered the Stormans family’s dual
claims: (1) that the rules had been enforced against them but not
against Catholic hospitals, and (2) that religiously-motivated
violations were punished but secularly-motivated violations were
not. 110 The court held that the evidence merely showed that the
enforcement process was complaint-driven, and that since no
complaints had been received against Catholic hospitals or
against secular refusals to dispense the drugs, there could be no
claim of selective enforcement. 111 The court proceeded to apply
rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, 112 and
concluded that the plaintiff’s free exercise claim lacked merit. 113
D. The Stormans Family Petitions the Supreme Court for
Certiorari
The Stormans family’s saga was not yet over, as they
proceeded to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
a writ of certiorari. 114 The eight-member court rejected the
petition 5-3 in June 2016; Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, strongly dissented from the decision
Id.
Id. at 1081–82.
109
Id. at 1082. Specifically, the Commission had issued official commentary
stating that a pharmacy could not object to delivering drugs because they are too
expensive. Id.
110
Id. at 1083.
111
Id.
112
Under Smith, courts apply rational basis review if the law is neutral,
generally applicable, and does not fall under one of the Smith exceptions. Heather
M. Good, “The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution”: The Parental Free Exercise
Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J.
641, 654 (2005).
113
Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1085.
114
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8.
107
108
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to deny review: “There are strong reasons to doubt whether
[Washington’s] regulations were adopted for—or that they
actually serve—any legitimate purpose.” 115 He continued, “there
is much evidence that the impetus for the adoption of the
regulations was hostility to pharmacists whose religious beliefs
regarding abortion and contraception are out of step with
prevailing opinion in the State.” 116 Justice Alito went on to
catalogue the findings of the trial court in regard to the
discriminatory motivation of the regulation, noting in particular
the emails of Mr. Saxe which referred explicitly to the Governor’s
desire to penalize conscience-based objections. 117 Justice Alito
also pointed out that the trial court had concluded that the
regulations as designed accomplished a “religious gerrymander,”
which had been one of the reasons the Court struck down the
regulations at issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye. 118
Justice Alito also criticized the Ninth Circuit for ignoring
evidence that the problem the State asserted it had an interest in
fixing did not actually exist. 119 Specifically, Justice Alito pointed
to the State’s own stipulation that “ ‘facilitated referrals do not
pose a threat to timely access to lawfully prescribed medications,’
and indeed ‘help assure timely access to lawfully prescribed
medications . . . includ[ing] Plan B.’ ” 120 Finally, Justice Alito
asserted that the numerous state pharmacy associations which
had filed briefs encouraging the Court to review the decision
showed the importance of providing Supreme Court review of the
issue. 121

115
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
116
Id.
117
Id. at 2434–35.
118
Id. at 2435 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. Specifically, Justice Alito cited the pharmacy associations’ contention that
the Ninth Circuit’s decision had “ ‘upheld a radical departure from past regulation of
the pharmacy industry’ that ‘threatens to reduce patient access to medication by
forcing some pharmacies—particularly small, independent ones that often survive
by providing specialty services not provided elsewhere—to close.’ ” Id. (quoting Brief
for Nat’l and State Pharmacists’ Ass’ns. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
4–5, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862)) (emphasis in
original).
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Justice Alito then gave a preliminary assessment of the
regulations’ neutrality and general applicability under Smith. 122
Justice Alito gave great weight to the trial court’s determinations
that the real operation of the rules almost exclusively burdened
those with religious and not secular objections to providing
emergency contraceptives. 123 He pointed out that the secular
exceptions have just as much potential to harm patient access as
do the proposed religious exceptions, and yet the secular
exceptions were allowed while the religious exceptions were
not. 124 Justice Alito went on to suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s
determination that the Board itself did not actually permit the
refusals for secular reasons was an improper usurpation of the
trial court’s fact-finding function. 125 Unlike the judges on the
Ninth Circuit panel, Justice Alito did not find persuasive the fact
that the Board’s enforcement mechanism was complaint-based. 126
Justice Alito also wrote on the regulations’ underinclusivity.
Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit panel, Justice Alito would
have found that the regulations as written were substantially
underinclusive. 127 Specifically, he found that the exemption
allowing pharmacies to refuse to dispense drugs to customers
who could not pay explicitly allowed pharmacies to reject
customers whose insurance the pharmacy did not accept. 128
Justice Alito pointed out that this included Medicare and
Medicaid insurance and that therefore a pharmacy could deny
access to all prescription drugs for certain customers. 129 Since
customers with Medicare or Medicaid are presumably the least
able to travel to other pharmacies to fill their prescription drug

Stormans, 136 S. Ct. at 2436–40.
Id. at 2437–38.
124
Id. at 2438.
125
“I think it likely that the Court of Appeals failed to accord the District
Court’s findings appropriate deference. ‘If the district court’s account of the evidence
is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence differently.’ ” Id. (quotng Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985)).
126
“[T]he point remains that the Board tolerates widespread secular refusals
while categorically declaring religious ones verboten. That supports the District
Court’s finding that the real operation of the regulations is to uniquely burden
religiously motivated conduct.” Id. at 2438–39 (internal quotations omitted).
127
Id. at 2439.
128
Id.
129
Id.
122
123
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needs, the regulation was substantially underinclusive.130
Justice Alito also gave significant weight to the appellant’s
contention that some pharmacy owners would rather close
entirely than dispense medications that their beliefs forbid:
The bottom line is clear: Washington would rather have no
pharmacy than one that doesn’t toe the line on abortifacient
emergency contraceptives.
Particularly given the State’s
stipulation that “facilitated referrals do not pose a threat to
timely access” to such drugs . . . it is hard not to view its actions
as exhibiting hostility toward religious objections. 131

In conclusion, the hotly-contested nature of the court
proceedings at all three levels of the federal court system
(including numerous amicus briefs on both sides at the Supreme
Court level) 132 suggests that the Supreme Court should have
granted the writ of certiorari in order to provide guidance to the
rest of the states as to the constitutionality of Washington’s
regulations.
III. THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND’S APPROACH TO PHARMACISTS’
CONSCIENCE REGULATIONS
While the State of Washington provides one example of an
approach to ensuring access to emergency contraceptives, this is
not the only approach that a government has taken to solving the
problem. The ROI also confronted the problem of how to ensure
access to emergency contraceptives while also respecting the
conscience rights of pharmacists, and its approach appears to
better balance the competing religious freedom and reproductive
rights at issue.
In 2007, ROI passed the Pharmacy Act of 2007. 133 The
Pharmacy Act of 2007 reconstituted the Pharmaceutical Society
of Ireland (“PSI”) and vested it with the authority to create a
comprehensive code of conduct for pharmacists operating in the
country. 134
Id.
Id. at 2240.
132
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, SCOTUSBLOG: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/stormans-inc-v-wiesman/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
133
Pharmacy Act 2007 (Act No. 20/2007) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/
2007/act/20/enacted/en/pdf
134
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS (PHARM. SOC’Y OF IR. 2009),
http://www.thepsi.ie/Libraries/Publications/Code_of_Conduct_for_pharmacists.sflb.a
130
131
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In 2008, the PSI consulted extensively with several
stakeholders as it worked to draft its regulations before
submitting the completed Code of Conduct to the Irish
parliament in 2009. 135 The Code the PSI ultimately submitted,
and which was ratified by the Irish parliament, is based on a sixprinciple system defining pharmacists’ duties. 136 Failure to
discharge one’s duties is considered professional misconduct and
subjects the pharmacist to discipline. 137
The most important of the six principles for the subject at
hand is Principle 1 and its accompanying commentary. Principle
1 acts as a foundational principle with reference to which all
other enumerated principles must be interpreted. 138 It states:
“The practice by a pharmacist of his/her profession must be
directed to maintaining and improving the health, wellbeing,
care and safety of the patient. This is the primary principle and
the following principles must be read in light of this principle.” 139
Thus, Principle 1 immediately establishes the importance of
ensuring patient access to drugs legitimately sought; this is
similar to Washington’s asserted interest in ensuring patient
access to all lawful medications. 140
The divergence between the Washington and ROI
approaches becomes clear in the commentary to Principle 1. The
commentary provides pharmacists with information on how they
can be sure they have discharged their obligations under the
Principle; it states in part that in order to fulfill one’s obligations
under the Principle, the pharmacist should “[e]nsure that in
instances where they are unable to provide prescribed medicines
or pharmacy services to a patient they must take reasonable
action to ensure these medicines/services are provided and the

shx (“The Pharmacy Act 2007 (‘the Act’) requires and enables pharmacists to
practise in their profession in a regulated, controlled and safe environment in a
manner that is focussed on the safety and interests of their patients.”).
135
Id. Contrast this approach with that of the State of Washington, which only
consulted with members of the pharmaceutical profession through the Governor’s
task force, which included a roughly equal number of pro-choice advocates and
pharmacists. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 940 (W.D. Wash. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015).
136
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
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patient’s care is not jeopardised.” 141 Thus, Principle 1, when read
in conjunction with its commentary, establishes that in certain
situations a pharmacist may be “unable” to provide prescribed
medicines or pharmacy services. A document providing specific
guidance for supplying an emergency contraceptive drug
establishes that a pharmacist may be “unable” to dispense the
drug because the pharmacist harbors moral objections to doing
so. 142
But what about the pharmacist’s duty to take “reasonable
action” to ensure that the patient can access the drug he or she
needs? The Irish courts have not spoken on what “reasonable
action” entails. The PSI’s own guidance on the subject is
vague, 143 but it seems that course of practice has established that
facilitated referrals satisfy the obligation. 144
As a matter of policy, the ROI’s method strikes the proper
balance between ensuring patient access to emergency
contraceptives while also respecting the conscience rights of
pharmacists. The absence of lawsuits disputing the effectiveness
of the system of facilitated referrals is telling. The fact that the
pharmaceutical profession itself created the rules 145 supports the
arguments made by state pharmaceutical associations in the
United States that the already-existing system of facilitated
referrals is an adequate solution to the problem of ensuring
access to contraceptives. 146

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134 (emphasis added).
See Guidance for Pharmacists on the Safe Supply of Non-Prescription
Levonorgestrel 1500mcg for Emergency Hormonal Contraception, PHARMACY
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: GUIDANCE ON THE SAFE SUPPLY OF MEDICINE (Pharm. Soc’y
of Ir., Dublin, Ir.), Dec. 4, 2016, at 6. http://www.thepsi.ie/Libraries/Folder_
Pharmacy_Practice_Guidance/03_5_PSI_Guidance_for_Pharmacists_on_the_Safe_S
upply_of_NonPrescription_Levonorgestral_1500mcg_for_Emergency_Hormonal_Contraception.sfl
b.ashx
143
Id. (“If supply to a patient is likely to be affected by the personal moral
standards of a pharmacist, he or she must inform their superintendent and
supervising pharmacist, who must ensure that suitable policies and procedures are
in place to ensure patient care is not jeopardised and the patient is facilitated in
accessing the information or service required to meet their needs.”).
144
Our Campaign, RE(AL)-PRODUCTIVE HEALTH, https://realproductivehealth.
com/our-campaign-2/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
145
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134.
146
Brief of Nat’l and State Pharmacists’ Ass’ns as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 16, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862).
141
142
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Additionally, the “reasonable action” standard is sufficiently
flexible to cover situations in which a facilitated referral will not
ensure patient access to the drug. If the facilitated referral
process will not work to ensure patient access to the drug, the
pharmacist will be bound by the explicit words of Principle 1 that
enshrine a patient-centered model of providing care. 147 Thus,
pharmacists who work at pharmacies that truly represent the
only means of accessing drugs in their communities will not be
able to shirk their obligations by referring patients to other
pharmacies inaccessible to them. The fact that a case alleging
such a situation has not arisen in the Irish court system suggests
that the current system is adequately meeting the needs of
patients. Calls to dispense with the facilitated referral system 148
are much like the State of Washington’s stocking and dispensing
regulations: a solution without a problem.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE STORMANS V. WIESMAN
PROBLEM
In the mid-2000s push to ensure access to emergency
contraceptives, the State of Washington went too far. While
ensuring access to these drugs can be considered a compelling
state interest, 149 there were alternative methods the State could
have used that would have better protected the conscience rights
of pharmacists who believe in good faith that they cannot
dispense these drugs without violating their religion. By denying
certiorari in Stormans v. Wiesman, the Supreme Court missed an
important opportunity to clarify the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause by striking down Washington’s regulations, which are
inferior as a matter of policy to the ROI’s “reasonable action”
approach. 150
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134.
Our Campaign, supra note 144.
149
Sch. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 86 F. Supp.
3d 1066, 1074–76 (W.D. Mo. 2015).
150
This Note does not argue that the ROI approach is the only constitutional
approach to regulations on stocking and dispensing emergency contraceptives, but
only that the regulations passed by Washington are unconstitutional and that the
ROI approach would represent the best policy for the state to adopt as an
alternative. In other words, the Supreme Court could have used the Stormans case
to suggest the ROI approach in dicta, since the only justiciable question which the
Stormans case would have presented to the Court is whether the specific regulations
adopted by Washington are constitutional as applied to the Stormans family and
other religious objectors.
147
148
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Washington’s Regulations Are Unconstitutional under Smith
and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye

Washington’s regulations violate the Free Exercise Clause
because they are not neutral laws of general applicability. As an
initial matter, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in finding that the
regulations at issue were “neutral” for Smith purposes. 151 As the
Supreme Court explained in Church of Lukumi, a regulation is
not neutral if it accomplishes a “religious gerrymander”; that is,
if the regulations are neutral on their face but only touch
religiously-based conduct. 152 As Justice Alito noted in his dissent
from the decision to deny certiorari, the trial court found
plentiful evidence in the form of emails and other
communications between those responsible for drafting
Washington’s regulations to show that they intended them
primarily to stamp out religious-based objections to the
dispensing of emergency contraceptives while leaving objections
for secular reasons untouched. 153 This is just the kind of
evidence that was present in Church of Lukumi and that Justice
Kennedy found persuasive in his assessment of whether or not
the regulation was neutral. 154
Furthermore, the Washington regulations are not generally
applicable. The trial court correctly found that the Washington
regulations fell under one of the exceptions to Smith: laws that
give an administrator the discretion to make an individualized
assessment are by definition not “generally applicable.” 155 While
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Board itself was not
permitting
exceptions
other
than
those
specifically
enumerated, 156 Justice Alito countered that the Ninth Circuit
had not given appropriate deference to the trial court’s conclusion
of fact on the subject. 157

Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535–36
(1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
153
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2434–35 (2016).
154
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 526–27.
155
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
156
Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1080–81.
157
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. at 2438. Specifically, the trial court
had found persuasive the testimony of individual board members that the Board as
a unit was allowing these exemptions to occur; the Ninth Circuit independently
concluded that the testimony of individual board members could not substitute for
the entire Board’s official commentary. Id.(citations omitted).
151
152
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Since the regulations are neither neutral nor generally
applicable, they must be subjected to Sherbert-style strict
scrutiny. 158 The Court has previously assumed, without deciding,
a compelling government interest in ensuring that citizens have
access to contraception. 159 Because the State of Washington
asserted a related interest in passing the regulations, 160 the first
element of strict scrutiny may be satisfied. The problems arise in
the application of the second part of the test.
After the government has proved a compelling interest, it
must show both that the action being challenged actually
advances the interest, and that it is the least restrictive means of
advancing that interest. 161 The Washington regulations satisfy
neither requirement. First, the trial court, reinforced by Justice
Alito, had already made a compelling argument that the
regulations are underinclusive with respect to the advancement
of its interest in providing access to contraceptives. 162
Specifically, the regulations are underinclusive in the sense that
they allow exemptions for a wide variety of secular reasons, both
explicitly in the regulations and as established in practice. 163
This causes the regulations not to advance the State’s interest in
that citizens still will not be able to access contraceptives as long
as the pharmacy can provide a valid secular reason for not
stocking or dispensing them. 164
Second, the regulations also do not advance the state
interest in the sense that they leave religious objectors with only
one option: getting out of the pharmacy business. 165 As Justice
Alito explained, this would leave the entire community served by
that pharmacy without a way of accessing any medications at
all; 166 this directly contradicts Washington’s asserted interest in
ensuring access to all medications, including contraceptives. 167

Marin, supra note 25, at 1438.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014).
160
Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1071.
161
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–09 (1963).
162
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 955–56 (W.D. Wash. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 969–70.
165
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2435 (2016) (citations omitted).
166
Id. at 2440.
167
Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
158
159
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Finally, the Washington regulations are not the least
restrictive means of advancing the state’s asserted interest. At
trial, the witnesses from the Board of Pharmacy were unable to
identify a single instance of a person being denied access to a
drug because of the system of facilitated referral, 168 and the State
itself even admitted that such referrals are “often the most
effective means to meet the patient’s request when a pharmacy
or pharmacist is unable or unwilling to provide the requested
medication.” 169 The Stormans family’s pharmacy itself is located
within a five-mile radius of thirty other pharmacies which stock
and dispense the emergency contraceptives that the Stormans
family were unwilling to dispense. 170 In sum, because the
Washington regulations are neither neutral nor generally
applicable, and since they cannot pass the Sherbert test,
Washington should adopt an alternative method for ensuring
access to emergency contraceptives that does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. The ROI approach provides the best alternative
from a policy perspective.
B. The ROI Approach is the Best Alternative from a Policy
Perspective
Had the Court exercised its opportunity to clarify the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause by striking down
Washington’s regulations, the state would have been forced to
craft new ones. The ROI’s “reasonable action” standard, with its
focus on facilitated referrals, represents the best option from a
policy perspective for a multitude of reasons.
First, the ROI approach was created by the pharmacy
industry’s own self-regulatory body in Ireland, 171 meaning that it
best reflects the opinions of those in the industry on how the
problem should be addressed. Because pharmacists themselves
are in the best position to determine both what steps are
necessary to ensure access—since they actually perform the
services that are being accessed—and whether and how to draw
the line between encouraging and compelling pharmacists to
perform their function in the community—since they themselves
must abide by the regulations they choose—their opinions on the
168
169
170
171

Id. at 947–48.
Id. at 934.
Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134.
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subject should be given special weight. Notably, the ROI
approach comports with the position taken by the over thirty
U.S. state pharmacist associations which together filed an
amicus brief to the Stormans family’s petition for certiorari. 172 In
sum, the pharmacists themselves have decided that the
facilitated referral approach is the best way to deal with the
access problem.
The second reason that the ROI approach represents the best
policy approach to this problem is that it has engendered little to
no judicial controversy in Ireland. As an initial matter, although
the ROI and the United States may not be similar from a
demographic perspective, 173 both countries have long grappled
with similar problems of balancing religious rights with rapidly
changing societal attitudes toward reproductive rights. 174
There has not been a single judicial challenge to the
“reasonable action” standard of facilitated referrals, and this
alone should carry great weight in evaluating its effectiveness.
While critics have asserted that problems do exist, 175 these
alleged problems have not manifested themselves as tangible
challenges to the effectiveness of facilitated referrals. This
comports with Washington’s own experience and that of the
many other states which provide conscience exemptions; an
access problem with facilitated referrals has simply not been
shown to exist. 176 In the absence of such a problem, it defies
reason to craft a solution which compels pharmacists to violate
their most basic beliefs.
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The third and final reason that the ROI approach represents
the best policy choice is that its “reasonable action” standard is
flexible enough to advance the state’s interest in solving access
problems once they do arise. Washington could adopt the
standard while including, in a commentary to the rule, a
stipulation that reasonable action might require an individual
pharmacy to stock and dispense emergency contraceptives if that
pharmacy is actually the only option reasonably available to
members of the community in which it exists.
Notably, this option would satisfy the “least restrictive
means” element of the Sherbert test—it would only require that
objectors stock and dispense emergency contraceptives when
there is no other option available to the people of the community.
While this might cause some smaller rural pharmacies to close
their doors rather than sell the drugs, Justice Alito acknowledged
that the marketplace would likely act to fill these gaps. 177
CONCLUSION
Despite the decline of adherence to organized religion in
America generally, 178 there is no doubt that the Free Exercise
Clause still has an important role to play in protecting the rights
of religious individuals not to be compelled to act against their
fundamental beliefs. When the Supreme Court does not provide
review of state court decisions that likely violate its substance, it
leaves the states without the guidance necessary to fashion their
laws in compliance with it.
At the same time, there is no doubt that attitudes in the
United States toward the use of contraceptives will continue to
evolve. As long as these competing aspirations—to safeguard
religious liberty and to protect the right of citizens’ access to the
medications they need—continue to conflict with one another, the
Court must exercise its power to protect important constitutional
rights. By choosing not to grant certiorari in the Stormans case,
the country’s highest court has thrown the viability of future
Free Exercise claims into doubt. Given the availability of a
workable alternative to Washington’s regulations in the form of
Id. at 2440.
See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in American Law:
Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones, ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED
STUDIES (Feb. 1, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399
470.
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the “reasonable action” approach, the Court’s decision not to
strike down Washington’s regulations is particularly troubling.
The current state of affairs is unacceptable to people like the
Stormans, and there is a compelling argument to be made that it
should not be acceptable to those who value the protections of the
rights of the minority which have characterized this country
throughout its existence.

